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The linkage between party mandates and legislative outputs is at the heart of representative government. 
Using an attention-based model, this article tests: the existence of a mandate effect; whether incumbents 
have incentives to uptake issues emphasised in their main competitors’ platforms; and whether the 
possibility of government alternation impacts on these two mechanisms. The analysis relies on datasets 
of the Italian Agendas Project recording the issue content of party manifestos and laws covering the 
period 1983-2012. The results of the time series cross-sectional models lend support to the presence of a 
mandate effect in Italy, a mechanism which was strengthened after the introduction of alternation in 
government after the 1994 elections. Additionally, opposition issues may have an impact in the 
legislative agenda, but only when considering the legislation initiated by MPs. Our findings have 
important implications for our understanding of the impact of government alternation expectations, a 
general institutional feature underlying - with varying intensity - all democracies, on the functioning of 
democratic representation.  
 
Keywords: agenda-setting, parliament, electoral mandate, opposition, issue attention  
Introduction 
How elected representatives set their policy priorities and, subsequently, manage to translate them into 
policy decisions is central to the functioning of democratic government. As such, this question has 
attracted substantial attention from comparative politics scholars. According to mandate theory (e.g. 
McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; McDonald and Budge 2005), political elections sanction the 
conferral of a mandate from voters to political parties. Parties are voted into government based on the 
platform of policy priorities that they present during election campaigns. Representatives know that they 
are expected to keep their campaign promises during their term in government if they do not want to face 
electoral punishment by their voters at the next election. Accordingly, mandate theory expects a high 
degree of congruence between the platforms of parties in power and the content of their decisions. 
Agenda setting studies (e.g. Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 2015) do not dismiss 
the relevance of electoral platforms, but point out that the transposition of electoral priorities into policy 
outputs is constrained by several factors. Some – notably political institutions such as the system of 
separation of powers and the party system – are usual suspects for scholars of comparative politics. 
Others, such as cognitive frictions and incoming information about policy problems, have been 
traditionally more familiar to public policy scholars (Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1984).1 In addition 
1 Cognitive friction refers to limitations in government’s capacity to deal simultaneously with the 
abundance of policy problems asking for attention and solutions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The 
default response to this complex environment is to implement marginal adjustments in most policy areas 
most of the time. Occasionally, when new information enters the system and mount pressure on policy-
makers to a level that cannot be disregarded (e.g. economic crises or natural disasters), government shifts 
their attention disproportionately. 
                                                 
to these multiple constraints and friction, agenda setting theories also describe a complex pattern of 
interactions between majority and opposition parties that may result in governing parties uptaking issues 
emphasised in the opposition’s platform (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, Seeberg 2013) to 
maximize their re-election chances. On the one hand, this strategy is aimed at neutralizing potential 
accusations from their competitors of having irresponsibly neglected certain problems (Sulkin 2005). On 
the other hand, these strategic responses may challenge the adversaries’ monopoly or “ownership” of 
certain issues (Sigelman & Buell 2004; Damore 2004; Sides 2006). 
Indeed, rather than as alternative accounts, party mandate and agenda-setting should be understood as 
coexisting “mechanisms through which a political system processes information to produce public 
policies” (Froio, Bevan, and Jennings 2016: 692). While they differ on the relevance assigned to the 
factors and processes affecting the congruence between electoral mandates and policy outputs, both agree 
on the relevance of political institutions, such as the agenda-setting power of the executive, the 
fragmentation and governance of the coalition or the role of the Prime Minister. 
 This article investigates the party program-to-policy link by analysing, first, the extent to which 
the content of the government or opposition’s platforms is related to the policy decisions taken by elected 
officials. It does so by bringing into focus the case of Italy, which represents a least-likely case to expect 
such link to be detected, because of its heterogenous and unstable majorities (Russo 2015), and the 
traditional weakness of the cabinet vis-à-vis the parliament in the legislative arena (Zucchini 2011). 
Second, it studies whether and how this connection relates to the possibility of alternation in government. 
It analyses how the change from a blocked system with one dominant party to a competitive system based 
on the alternation in power of two competing coalition blocs influenced the transmission of party 
priorities to legislative outputs. Our contribution to the literature lies precisely in analysing whether the 
introduction of credible government alternation after 1993 increases the program-to-policy linkage. We 
argue that Italy provides a unique case study to investigate the effect of different models of party 
competition on this mechanism, while controlling for relevant structural factors.  
The article also contributes to research on party government in Italy. Italian law-making before 1993 has 
often been depicted as unpredictable and relatively unresponsive to party programs (Di Palma 1977). 
Indeed, the move from a proportional to a mixed electoral system in the early 1990s was also triggered 
by a desire to establish a more direct relationship between voters and representatives. By tracing party 
attention and government action to policies over long periods of time, our research design allows 
analysing whether such radical change in the political system brought about a closer linkage between 
electoral programmes and the legislative output. We thus provide empirical evidence on a crucial case 
which has rarely appeared in extensive comparative studies (e.g. Klingemann et al. 1994) or has mostly 
been studied by evaluating the rate of pledge fulfilment for a limited number of governments (Moury 
2011; Newell 2000). 
It is worth pointing out that we do not look at either the fulfilment of single pledges (Mansergh and 
Thomson 2007) or at by-issue variation, that is, at whether some parties are more responsive to specific 
policy areas. Rather, we focus on the composition of the policy agenda as a whole and analyse the 
congruence of the distribution of attention across all policy issues in party manifestos and legislative 
priorities, an approach adopted also by other works (Baumgartner, Brouard, and Grossman 2010; 
Borghetto, Carammia, and Zucchini 2014; Brouard et al. forthcoming; Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011; 
Froio, Bevan, and Jennings 2016; Persico, Froio, and Guinaudeau 2012).  
To reconstruct the electoral and legislative agendas, our analysis relies on the policy content coding of 
all party platforms and primary acts adopted in Italy between 1983 and 2013 using the coding system 
developed by the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al. 2011, 
www.comparativeagendas.net). We measure attention to policy issues (the share of mentions of single 
policy areas in party manifestos and the share of laws adopted in each of those policy areas), not policy 
preferences (that is, the policy position of parties and government on single issues). We do not deny that 
policy preferences are relevant to party competition and policy making – quite the opposite. We simply 
contend that a focus on policy attention is key to understand the “struggle for control over the political 
agenda [… and that] studying this process is a natural way to learn how political systems function and 
change over time” (Green-Pedersend and Walgrave 2014, 1-2). 
The article is organized as follows. Having set the stage for the analysis by discussing existing theories 
on the relationship between party policy priorities and the legislative agenda, we make our expectations 
explicit and develop three hypotheses. We then show how those expectations apply to the analysis of the 
Italian transition, and illustrate the data and methods used to test them empirically. Finally, we present 
our findings and draw some conclusions. 
Alternation in power and the programme-to-policy link 
One of the tenets of representative democracy is that a legislator’s behaviour in office should take into 
account the interests of the voter (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). The so-called promissory model 
of representation (Mansbridge 2003) assigns political parties a fundamental role in the policy process, as 
“they alone tie representatives to a particular set of past and promised policies on which voters can make 
an informed choice in the elections” (Budge and Hofferbert 1990, 113). Beyond rhetorical statements 
and attacks to the opponents, party competition during election campaigns revolves primarily around 
pledges and intentions that political parties promise to fulfil, if voted into office. Through electoral 
manifestos, political parties outline their distinctive profiles and make them public by emphasizing those 
issues that they repute will gain them votes, while trying to de-prioritize those issues that might advantage 
their opponents (Petrocik 1996; Budge and Farlie 1983; for a review see Budge 2015). In sum, it is on 
the basis of distinct manifestos that political parties compete during election campaigns; and it is through 
party competition that voters make sense of the policy stances of each party, and choose the party that is 
closer to their preferences. 
Empirical evidence on whether party manifestoes matter to policy making has been mixed so far. For 
example, Klingemann et al. (1994) found a strong correlation between policy priorities emphasized 
before elections in party manifestos and patterns of budgetary allocations (Budge and Keman 1990; 
Hofferbert and Budge 1992). However, Imbeau et al’s. (2001) meta-analysis of 43 policy studies on the 
subject showed no consistent linkage between the left-right composition of governments and policy 
output. Only recently, empirical research shifted the focus on the congruence between government party 
agendas and law-making priorities (Baumgartner, Brouard, and Grossman 2010; Borghetto, Carammia, 
and Zucchini 2014; Brouard et al. forthcoming; Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011; Froio, Bevan, and 
Jennings 2016; Persico, Froio, and Guinaudeau 2012). Against this background, our first hypothesis 
makes the basic point that some degree of mandate effect is generally present in democracies: 
H1: The issue emphasis of majority manifestos positively affects the legislative agenda. 
The agenda-setting approach shifts the attention to the fact that governments have to adapt to a constant 
flow of information and thus address problems that were not foreseen at the time of election (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). They have to please not only the voters that voted them into office in the first place, 
but also their future voters. Governments also have to constantly keep track of changes in public opinion 
(Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien and Soroka 2012), respond to the media (Vliegenthart 
et al. 2016) and maintain open channels of communication with interest groups (Hall and Deardoff 2006). 
Moreover, problem-solving is certainly a key factor for policy-making (Adler and Wilkerson 2013). 
According to this model, we should not entirely discard some level of congruence between the priorities 
of governing parties and the legislative agenda. Strategic and forward-looking representatives do have 
an incentive to show that, given the opportunity, they carry through their programmatic priorities. 
However, a wide range of factors may push them away from electoral promises.2 
This article pays particular attention to one such factor – political oppositions – and tests whether parties 
in governments also respond to the issues prioritized by their rivals.3 Recent empirical work on parties’ 
issue campaigning provided consistent evidence that political parties do not simply focus on the issues 
on which they hold an advantage over their competitors, and simply disregard all the others (issue 
ownership); parties also tend to engage in direct confrontation on the same issues (issue overlap) 
(Sigelman and Buell 2004; Damore 2004; Sides 2006). Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) and 
Seeberg (2013) showed that the ‘party system agenda’ – the set of issues object of inter-party discussion 
at a specific point in time – is strongly influenced by opposition parties and this, in turn, can constrain 
the activities of governing parties. 
Why should government parties also respond to the issues emphasized by their opponents in the election 
campaign? Sulkin (2005) defines “issue uptake” as the strategic activity in which “challengers have an 
incentive to identify salient issues that the incumbent has previously neglected and to prioritize these 
2 Agenda-setting scholars mitigated the claim that the ‘program-to-policy’ link is a normative requisite 
for the good functioning of democracies: besides respecting electoral commitments, governments also 
need to govern (Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2011, 954), and this implies addressing new or 
changing priorities that may be different than those formulated during election campaigns. 
3 Once again, the role of opposition parties is not entirely discarded by advocates of mandate politics:  
“[c]onstitutional and practical political considerations structure the situation in such a manner that those 
(temporarily) invested with authority must take some account of the agendas of ‘out’ parties” 
(Klingemann et al. 1994, 49).  
                                                 
issues in their campaigns. Winners are motivated to respond to these signals and act on their challengers’ 
issues in office to remedy their weaknesses and promote their future re-election prospects.” (Ibid: 168). 
This does not necessarily imply an alignment with the policy position of opposition parties.4 Rather, 
majority parties are forced to take up issues they would have otherwise neglected. 
Because they outline the main directives on which the challenger runs its electoral campaigns, party 
manifestos represent one of the major sources of information on which the incumbent builds its 
expectations on the lines of attacks of its opponent. Incumbents will be better placed to shore up those 
‘weaknesses’ if at the end of their term in office they can show some record of uptake. Addressing an 
issue through legislation is often the best option to counter the blame, because it depoliticizes the issue 
rather than rising the hype around it (Seeberg 2013). Therefore, from an issue uptake perspective we 
should expect that the content of challengers’ manifestos would contribute to shaping the majority’s 
subsequent activity in office. Another reason to “trespass” is to counteract or undermine the competitors’ 
issue ownership, i.e. changing the voter’s perception on which party has the best solutions in that area. 
4 Policy agenda scholars use different lenses to read into this relationship: their focus is not much on the 
congruence of position but on the congruence of attention to issues between representatives and the 
voters. This change of perspective has fundamental consequences on expectations about policy 
responsiveness. First, this account views the process of legislative representation as far more dynamic. 
Even though actors’ policy preferences may remain stable for long time, incoming information about 
policy problems and ways to deal with them, coming from outside and/or from within the political 
system, continuously reshapes actors’ policy priorities (Jones 1994). Second, and more interestingly 
given our interest on the linkage between elections and legislative behavior, agenda-setting scholars 
highlight a number of reasons whereby the agenda of the governing party should be only one among 
several other factors affecting the content of legislative outputs. 
                                                 
Although this is less frequent, there are studies documenting instances in which this strategy was 
successfully employed (e.g. Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen 2004). 
In sum, mandate and agenda models lead to rather different expectations on the party program-to-policy 
congruence. The former predicts that majority coalition platforms will be the main policy templates for 
legislative decisions. There is little incentive to incorporate the priorities of challengers, because this 
would divert attention and resources away from the issues ‘owned’ that have a potentially higher payoff: 
building a reputation of efficiency in the eyes of electors. Conversely, in line with the agenda-setting 
perspective, the issue uptake hypothesis implies that opposition party manifestos should also have an 
impact on subsequent legislative decisions of the majority. Campaigns represent an important source of 
information on the issues that will be more rewarding in the future. On the one hand, governments can 
pre-empt the opponents’ attacks. On the other, they can challenge their ownership over specific issues. 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis drawing on the agenda model reads as follows: 
H2:  The issue emphasis of the opposition manifestos positively affects the legislative agenda. 
Political institutions matter – but how exactly? Comparative politics studies have traditionally 
emphasised the distinction between consensus and majoritarian models of democracy, entailing different 
levels of centralisation or dispersion of decision-making power (Lijphart 2012). By centralising power 
in the hands of government, and exposing them to the threat of electoral sanctions, more majoritarian 
institutional designs should facilitate the translation of inputs into outputs. In contrast, because they 
disperse power across multiple actors and institutions, and they complicate the assignment of 
responsibilities for policy choices, more consensual institutions should be expected to constrain the 
transposition of electoral priorities. 
While acknowledging the relevance of this categorisation, this article draws attention to a relatively 
unexplored institutional feature that is alleged to have an impact on the studied mechanism: the 
possibility of government alternation. This is different from mere cabinet turnover (Curini and Zucchini 
2012: 828). We define it as the perception of voters and representatives that a concrete possibility exists 
that the incumbent may be replaced through elections by an actor with different policy preferences 
(Bartolini 2000, Pellegata 2016). On the one hand, since the possibility of alternation in government 
implies a greater vulnerability for the incumbent, it should create the conditions for a significant and 
positive effect of policy priorities on legislative output for parties in government. On the other hand, the 
greater vulnerability of incumbents to oppositions’ attacks in a competitive alternation system should 
also create incentives for incumbents to trespass on their rivals’ issue. 
The relevance of government alternation to the transmission of electoral priorities to policy outputs needs 
clarification. While mandate and agenda models differ under several respects, both are premised on the 
implicit assumption that the conditions exist for alternation in power. The mandate model is grounded 
on the idea that political parties compete to become a majority and, once in office, the threat of losing 
the next elections pushes them to carry through their policy program. If elections do not imply the shift 
of power (at least not entirely) from incumbent cabinet parties to other political forces, there is little 
incentive to stick to the mandate. Research based on the agenda model also largely assumes that a real 
competition for political positions is actually in place. For instance, competition for election in single 
districts, and thus in the US Congress, is a central tenet of the issue-uptake theory in Sulkin’s analysis 
(2005). Losing elections and not returning to Congress is a concrete possibility for individual 
representatives. Indeed, issue-uptake by Congressmen is expected to increase as “vulnerability”, i.e. the 
chance of not being re-elected, grows (Sulkin 2005: 91). Re-election-oriented incumbents will not feel 
obliged to pay attention to opponents’ issue priorities, in turn, if their prospects of being returned to office 
are already high. This line of reasoning results in our third hypothesis: 
H3: Both the “mandate” and “opposition” effect should become stronger when there is a credible 
possibility of alternation. 
Country selection: Italy (1983-2013) 
In the early 1990s, the Italian political system underwent a radical institutional and political change. The 
transformation cascaded from the electoral law, adopted in 1993, to political parties, the party system, 
and the relationship between government and parliament. Consequently, the system shifted from a 
blocked political system with no alternation in power (1948-1994) to one where alternation became the 
rule: no coalition was confirmed in power at any of the five elections held between 1996 and 2013. As 
such, post-war Italy offers a privileged case study to analyse the impact of the transformation from a 
pivotal to an alternational party system on the programme-to-policy link. 
Post-war Italy featured for its first 40 years a remarkably stable party system, characterised by two anti-
system parties (the Communist Pci and the post-fascist Msi) making a bipolar opposition against a 
centrist coalition permanently led by the Christian Democrats (Dc). In this setting, government turnover 
was by and large peripheral, namely it consisted in the Dc creating different coalition partnerships with 
smaller parties in its ideological neighbourhood, while the anti-system credentials of the greatest 
opposition party, the Pci, excluded it from possible coalition solutions. The remote likelihood of 
alternation in power clearly affected the legislative behaviour of elected officials. Majority parties could 
decide to delay structural reforms, those more likely to be publicised in the coalition program, without 
the fear of getting replaced at the subsequent elections (for a spatial analysis explanation of the effect of 
the lack of alternation on major policy changes see Zucchini 2011).5 Vice versa, opposition parties could 
indulge in the so-called ‘politics of outbidding’ or ‘overpromising’, since they did not have to respond 
of their pledges in front of their voters (Sartori 1976).  
5 As aptly put by Di Palma (1977: 190-1):  “What the government introduces in Parliament has little to 
do with the legislative programs that coalition partners agree upon at the outset of every new 
coalition.[…] The bulk of proposed government legislation is made of provisions not always so important 
as to be sanctioned in the coalition program, yet necessary to keep the machinery of government and 
private interests going and sufficiently narrow to obtain coalition support within the cabinet”. 
                                                 
Although the pre- and post-1993 periods are often referred to as, respectively, “First” and “Second” 
Republic, the trigger of change was not constitutional reforms. Rather, it was the joint occurrence of 
international (end of the Cold War) and domestic events (the fiscal crisis; the criminal prosecution of a 
significant portion of the ruling elites known as “clean hands”; the change of the electoral law from a 
proportional to a mixed system) that determined the collapse or transformation of all those parties that 
governed Italy throughout the First Republic (e.g. Newell 2000).  
In this work, we treat the two short legislative terms between 1992-1996 as a ‘transition period’. During 
the first term, the 11th, Italy abandoned - as a consequence of a referendum - its proportional electoral 
system and shifted to a mixed system, favouring the creation of pre-electoral coalitions. But it was in 
1994 that the change in electoral behaviour - at the first elections using the new rules - resulted in a 
radical breakdown of the party system, with the collapse of the Dc and the emergence of a new party, 
Forza Italia, as the most voted political force.  
We take the 13th legislative term (1996-2001) as the beginning of the Second Republic. This was both 
the first alternation in power in republican history and the first time a leftist coalition won the elections. 
Italy seemed to have taken the path of a competitive democracy. The change is apparent when looking 
at electoral outcomes and the perfect alternation between two centre-left coalitions (1996 and 2006) and 
two centre-right coalitions (2001 and 2008). On the surface, this change implied a relative simplification 
of the system shaped as a bipolar competition between pre-electoral coalitions headed by clearly 
identified leaders – the candidates of each coalition to the position of Premier. Coalition agreements, on 
their turn, took the form of large pre-electoral “coalition manifestos”, spelling out policy pledges as in 
typical majoritarian democracies. More importantly, under a system where the risk of electoral 
punishment for not fulfilling the electoral program increased exponentially, parties faced stronger 
incentives to be both responsible (make more realistic bids) and responsive (meet the increasing 
expectation from their voters that they ‘respect their promises’). What did not change with respect to the 
format of the previous party system is the fragmentation and the level of ideological distance, which 
remained always significant (Ignazi 2017).6 We argue that this mix of continuities and changes makes 
Italy a perfect case to study the impact of credible alternation in power on the programme-to-policy link. 
In sum, a set of formal (new electoral rules) and informal (collapse of the old party system) factors made 
alternation to government, previously not a credible option, a likely one. The effect of these set of factors 
makes us expect a stronger effect of policy programs on policy-making. However, in line with our third 
hypothesis, we also expect an increase in the incentives to engage in issue uptake in the competitive 
Second Republic. 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, this article uses data built using the coding system of the Italian Policy Agendas 
Project (Borghetto and Carammia 2010). Under the supervision of the authors, teams of trained coders 
located respectively at the University of Catania and the State University of Milan coded the policy 
content of party programs and legislation using the Italian policy agendas codebook, which envisages a 
total of 21 main policy areas (see appendix). Our dependent and main independent variables are the share 
of attention devoted to each of these policy areas respectively in the legislative agenda and in the party 
agenda of the majority and the opposition. More information on the operationalization of these and other 
control variables is given below. 
6 In order to overcome the fetters of a still slow and cumbersome legislative process, executives made a 
greater use of existing procedural tools, such as delegation acts, which ultimately reinforce the 
government agenda-setting power with respect to the parliament (Zucchini 2011).  
                                                 
Dependent Variables: Law-making  
Data on legislative outputs were drawn from the Italian Law-Making database (Borghetto et al. 2012) 
and comprise a total of 5615 content-coded acts. We filtered out laws ratifying international treaties 
(n=1343) and budget laws (n=142), so our final data set includes 3214 acts. The former are, to some 
extent, technical measures by and large exogenous to domestic party politics. The latter are mostly 
complex bills with heterogeneous content spanning many sectors and thus they could not be assigned to 
a specific topic area. 
We also run the analysis on the subset of executive-sponsored legislation (n=2213, 69 per cent of the 
total). The Italian law-making process put relatively little constraints on legislative initiative. Single MPs 
can and do propose a large number of bills, yet - differently from executive sponsored bills - most of 
these are never turned into actual laws (Kreppel 2009). Therefore, testing our model using only those 
laws initiated by the government should provide a more detailed understanding of the operation of the 
mandate hypothesis, as well as a more stringent test of the issue uptake hypothesis. 
To obtain a yearly measure of the legislative agenda, we did not use the calendar year to aggregate laws 
since elections normally fall in the middle of the year. Rather, each legislative term was divided in periods 
of 365 days. This entailed that the last year of the legislature has slightly more or less than 365 days.7 
Finally, each version of the variable is calculated as a percentage of the total laws in each legislative term 
and therefore represents the share of attention given to each topic relative to every other topic legislated 
on that year.     
 
7 The last legislature years include 355 days on average, with a standard deviation of 33. The longest 
one occurs during the 12th (391 days) and the shorter during the 10th (297 days).  
                                                 
Independent Variables: Party platforms 
For party manifestos, we focus on the number of ‘quasi-sentences’, i.e. each part of a single sentence 
which includes a logically autonomous statement. Overall, the party manifestos included in the dataset 
have been broken-up into more than 39,000 quasi-sentences, each coded based on its main policy content.  
Note that, in the Italian case, formal post-election coalition agreements have never been signed. On the 
other hand, the reforms of the electoral law adopted in 1993 and 2005 provided powerful incentives for 
political parties to form pre-election coalitions. When available, we coded pre-election coalition 
manifestos. When these were not available, we were confronted with the need to merge single parties’ 
manifestos.8 Our aggregation criterion is based on the idea that in forming the legislative agenda of the 
coalition, parties with a larger representation in parliament have a stronger bargaining power (Strøm 
1990). This translates into a measure of coalition agenda where the mean of party agendas for each issue 
is weighted by their relative share of seats in the Lower Chamber. Since we take legislative years as our 
time units and manifestos are only written before a new election, we repeat our measure of the majority 
and opposition party platforms for each legislative year making up the legislative term.9 The same 
 
8 During the First Republic coalitions were post-electoral and their main policy lines also were generally 
agreed after elections, when single parties could count their votes and bargain agreements (mainly on the 
distribution of government portfolios) far from the spotlight of public attention (Verzichelli and Cotta 
2000).  
9 Therefore, for the 11th, 12th, and 15th legislative terms we repeat the party agenda twice, in the case of 
the 9th term four times and for the remaining terms five times. Functionally, this means our party platform 
measures occur before our law-making data easing concerns over endogeneity. Furthermore, while party 
                                                 
procedure was used to compute the agenda of the main opposition coalition or party (e.g. the Pci in the 
First Republic).  
Control variables 
Our models include three legislature-specific control variables. The first variable is total government 
support (Government Seats) and measures the seat share of all parties in government weighted by the 
numbers of days in office in each year. Additionally, the effective number of parties uses Laakso and 
Taagepera’ formula and data on parliamentary seats (1979) to produce a legislature-specific score. Both 
indexes were drawn from Armigeon et al. (2016). Finally, ideological distance (Rile score) measures the 
difference between the left-most and right-most party for each legislature using estimates of party 
positioning on the left-right axis provided by the Manifesto Research Project (Volkens et al. 2015).10 
These three control variables aim at accounting for institutional characteristics of the legislative terms 
which are reputed to have an impact on the capacity of a majority coalition to implement its agenda: the 
platforms are likely to be partially based on previous law-making, many other factors like issue 
ownership, events, public opinion polling and more will go into individual manifestos that is further 
complicated by our aggregation of platforms making reverse causality quite unlikely.  
10 Additionally, we controlled for ideological distance (data from Volkens et al. 2015) and number of 
“necessary” parties within the governing coalition, plus a categorical variable for the type of government 
(minimal winning coalition, surplus coalition, multi-party minority government and technocratic 
government as classified in Armigeon et al., 2016). The results were not affected.   
                                                 
parliamentary support it can rely upon, the fragmentation of the parliamentary arena and its level of 
ideological heterogeneity.11  
Analyses 
The consistent topic coding across each of these datasets allows us to test the general relationship between 
both the majority and opposition agendas in relation to legislative outputs. Before moving on with the 
analysis, it is useful to inspect visually. Figure 1 presents the weighted majority and main opposition 
agendas alongside the all laws measure for each topic. While the laws measure varies from year to year, 
the majority and opposition agendas measures are repeated throughout the legislative session 
representing the stated priorities of the parties before the most recent election. Here the two vertical 
dashed lines indicate the end of the first republic and the beginning of the second republic with the period 
in-between representing the transition. Importantly this demonstrates that there is attention and 
movement on all issues, and except for government operations which includes several reforms around 
the transition period, no clear patterns or trends seem to emerge. 
11 We also checked for the presence of ‘electoral cycle’ effects to legislative productivity, by introducing 
two dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the year is respectively the first (post-electoral) and the 
last (pre-electoral) in the legislative term. This did not change our results and we have excluded it from 
our analyses.  
 
                                                 




To test our expectations, we make use of ordinary least squares in a time series cross-sectional design 
with panel corrected standard errors. Years are used as our unit of time and each major topic code acting 
as an individual panel producing a total N of 630 (30 years (T) * 21 major topics (n)) observations.  
Specification tests for each panel demonstrate no clear time series processes in the form of autoregression 
or a moving average and unit root tests also offer no evidence of such a process for all panels matching 
our visual inspection of Figure 1. Finally, most panels are white noise according to the Ljung–Box Q that 
tests for the joint significance of autocorrelations across a number of lags. 
In order to test our hypotheses concerning the differences in the effects of the majority and opposition 
agendas during different time periods we make use of a number of multiplicative interaction terms 
between the majority and opposition agendas measures and dummy variables coded 1 for the first (1983-
1991) and second republic (1996-2013) and zero otherwise. Namely, we include a majority first republic 
and a majority second republic interaction as well as an opposition first republic and an opposition second 
republic in our models. These interaction terms allow us to calculate substantively meaningful marginal 
effects for the majority and opposition agendas with the transition period as the omitted time period. As 
is necessary with interaction terms we further include the first and second republic dummy variables in 
the model separately although we have no expectation for differences in the overall number of laws by 
year based on time period.  
Our analyses are completed for two versions of the dependent variable, namely all laws and all executive 
sponsored laws. The results comparing the two dependent variables are presented in Table 2 and to fully 





Table 2: Weighted Majority and Main Opposition Agendas on the legislative agenda 
 
 All Laws Executive Sponsored 
Laws 
Majority 0.957*** 0.801*** 
 (0.255) (0.238) 
Majority * 1st -0.728** -0.537* 
 (0.278) (0.270)* 
Majority * 2nd -0.696** -0.496+ 
 (0.268) (0.256) 
Opposition -0.029 0.053 
 (0.120) (0.116) 
Opposition * 1st 0.205 0.135 
 (0.155) (0.161) 
Opposition * 2nd 0.231+ 0.099 
 (0.140) (0.143) 
1st 0.025** 0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
2nd 0.022** 0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Government Seats -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Effective Number of Parties 0.114** 0.056 
 (0.040) (0.048) 
Rile Score -0.008*** -0.005+ 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.003 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
R2 0.32 0.28 
N 630 630 







Table 3: Marginal Effect of Weighted Majority and Main Opposition Agendas on the legislative agenda 
 
Marginal Effects 




Majority 1st Republic 0.229* 0.264* 
 (0.110) (0.126) 
Majority Transition 0.957*** 0.801*** 
 (0.251) (0.238) 
Majority 2nd Republic 0.261*** 0.305*** 
 (0.081) (0.092) 
Opposition 1st Republic 0.177+ 0.188+ 
 (0.098) (0.113) 
Opposition Transition -0.029 0.053 
 (0.120) (0.116) 
Opposition 2nd Republic 0.203** 0.152+ 
 (0.073) (0.084) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
As our primary findings contain interactions we first focus our discussion on the marginal effects for the 
first republic, transition period and second republic contained in Table 3 where our marginal effects 
calculations are based on an appropriate combination of the majority and opposition variables with the 
relevant interaction or in the base variable for the transition (see Brambor et al 2005). 
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we find a positive and significant effect of the majority agenda in both 
the first and second republic for the two models. Further support for this hypothesis also exists during 
the transition period where the focus on reform had comparatively large positive and significant 
coefficients in both models. Substantively the results in Table 3 indicate the average congruence rate of 
priorities of the weighted majority and main opposition manifestos by our different legislative outputs. 
This can be expressed as a percentage. For example, during the Second Republic there was a 30.5 per 
cent match between the weighted majority manifesto mentions and the executive-sponsored legislative 
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agenda. For the sake of interpretation, t is important to remember that our variables account for the 
distribution of attention and is therefore not a direct indicator of the fulfilment of manifesto pledges. 
The effect intensifies by becoming both larger and more significant in the second republic over the first 
pointing to the attempt by the majority coalition to follow the priorities of its legislative agenda and 
offering support for H3 that posited that the effect should increase with the introduction of alternation.12 
In both of our models the effect of the opposition was positive, but only marginally significant during 
the first republic and in the second republic when looking at executive laws. These findings offer only 
limited support for H2, that the opposition parties influence the majority agenda through issue uptake. 
During the second republic the effect of the opposition agenda was however both positive and significant 
when considering the whole legislative agenda, namely the agenda that takes into consideration 
legislation sponsored by both the executive and MPs. We take this as evidence that the introduction of 
alternation brought a greater incentive for the majority to engage in the issue-uptake of main opposition 
priorities, but only in the residual part of legislation starting in parliament. It is in this arena that majority 
and opposition meet and, at times, find compromises. Consistently with the mandate hypothesis, 
executive-sponsored legislation - which has a far higher adoption rate and increasingly represents the 
lion’s share of legislative output in Italy (Kreppel 2009) - is used to deliver on the issues emphasised in 
the majority agenda.     
As regards the legislature-specific models’ controls (see Table 2) – which, according to the literature, are 
relevant for legislative productivity -  no effects were found for the number of government seats, but our 
12 It should be noted that while these effects do not overlap for all laws, their confidence intervals do 
meaning that while H3 is supported, that support is not as strong as it could be. 
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other two controls (Rile Score and Effective number of parties) were significant in the “all laws” model. 
Finally, model fit denoted by the R-squared is slightly higher for all laws indicating that our model is 
best at explaining this part of the law-making agenda.  
Conclusion 
The transmission of priorities from voters to parties and their translation into public policy is at the heart 
of what many mean by democracy (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Robertson 1976). Yet, the 
extent to which, once in government, political parties stick to the policy priorities emphasized during 
election campaigns is still a contested question. In this article we use thirty years of data on the Italian 
political system to test the influence of party mandates on the legislative agenda, the extent to which 
majorities also try to take up issues from the opposition platforms and, finally, how these two strategies 
are affected by changes in the institutional context. Because of the fragmentation of its majority coalitions 
and the weakness of the cabinet powers, Italy represents a least-likely case to observe an operative 
mandate effect. Moreover, with its shift from a blocked system to a system of alternation in government, 
Italy provides a quasi-experimental context for studying the effect of the exposure to increased party 
competitiveness on the party program-to-policy link. 
We find robust evidence that both a mandate and a weaker, but still present opposition effects are at play 
under the new alternation system when the whole legislative agenda is considered. Overall, these findings 
point to the complex and dynamic character of the governmental process. While there is evidence of a 
mandate effect following the introduction of alternation – which supports previous research on the topic 
(Borghetto et al. 2014, Borghetto and Carammia 2015) – mandate politics seems to capture only part of 
the picture. The paradox of the introduction of alternation in Italy is that both the effect of the majority’s 
and that of the main opposition’s agenda became stronger. On the other hand, when our model is run 
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only on executive-sponsored legislation, we find that the effect of the main opposition agenda decreases 
in the Second Republic, which casts doubt on the actual application of an issue uptake strategy 
specifically by the government. Rather, these results point out that MPs-sponsored legislation represents 
the preferred channel to pragmatically integrate a wider range of issues in the legislative agenda, some 
of them resulting also from the opposition’s initiative. This supports previous findings (Giuliani 2008), 
pointing to a continuity in the level of consensual law-making in Italy.             
Although our study focused on a single case study and considered a rather exceptional and sudden shift 
from a strong pivotal to an alternational system (the only other similar case among modern democracies 
being Japan), our findings still bear significance for a wider debate on the impact of partisanship on 
policy-making. We provided evidence that possible alternation is a factor that should be taken into 
consideration when analysing the congruence between the priorities outlined in policy platforms and the 
areas of legislative actions. This relationship deserves further analysis in other democratic systems that 
did not experience government alternation for long periods such as, for instance, some Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the relationship between majority and opposition, and the 
way in which each contributes to shaping the agenda of government, appears to be more complex than 
is generally assumed. Our findings reveal that differentiating between legislation sponsored by MPs and 
by the executive could be a useful perspective to understand how issues closer to the opposition agenda 
can find their way into legislation.   
Future research should also more closely investigate the party strategies aimed at influencing voters’ 
perceptions over the attribution of issue ownership. We still know little about how issue trespassing is 
used, whether it is directed to weaken the opponent’s issue ownership or, when the circumstances allow 
it, to steal it. Remarkably, however, this strategy is sometimes very clearly put in place in everyday 
politics. For example, in the summer of 2017, the main party in government, the Democratic Party, tabled 
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a bill to abolish the so-called “vitalizi” (the life pension granted to MPs who have served for at least four 
and a half years). This “anti-caste” measure, a valence issue in its essence, was not included in its 
manifesto but in that of its main opponent, the Five Star Movement. Successful or not, the Democrats’ 
move was a clear attempt to disarm the M5S anti-elite attacks in the coming 2018 elections, by 
preventively shifting their position closer to the Movement on the need to lower the “costs” of politics. 
Future studies should also focus on the influence of additional agendas on the manifesto-policy link, 
namely the role of media and public opinion (see for instance Froio et al. 2016 and Visconti 2018). These 
actors exert pressure on government actors along the whole political mandate and may end up mediating 
the impact of the opposition agendas: ultimately the government should take up its rivals’ issues only 
when they are likely to dominate the next election. Finally, future research should incorporate issue 
preferences, which – alongside attention – are a fundamental determinant of party competition. For 
instance, the greater the distance between a governing party and its rival on a popular issue, the more 
difficult for the former to effectively take it up without triggering revolts in the party and among its 
supporters. Even with these limitations, our contribution sheds new light on the transmission of electoral 
mandates into policy agendas. 
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